Germany’s Last Chance to Secure Its Future

Friedrich Merz, poised to become Germany’s next chancellor, used his election victory on Sunday to deliver an extraordinary warning—not about Germany’s sluggish economy or the alarming rise of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), but about the reliability of its most important ally, the United States. His remarks were a stunning indictment of President Donald Trump’s administration.

“It is clear that the Americans, or at least this administration, are largely indifferent to the fate of Europe,” Merz declared, making European independence from the U.S. his “absolute priority.” These words are remarkable coming from a committed Atlanticist and leader of the Christian Democrats (CDU). Yet, his assessment is correct: Europe must prepare to defend itself without relying on American military support. The challenge, however, lies in turning rhetoric into action.

Germany—like the rest of Europe—needs a massive increase in defense spending. However, a constitutional amendment passed by a previous coalition government imposes a strict “debt brake,” capping structural deficits at a mere 0.35% of GDP outside of emergencies. This fiscal straitjacket now poses a major obstacle to urgent military investment. Worse still, after Sunday’s election, the parliamentary arithmetic makes repealing or amending this restriction nearly impossible.

Germany’s two dominant postwar parties suffered a bruising election. While the CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the CSU, finished first, their performance was the second-worst in history. The outgoing Social Democrats (SPD) fared even worse, recording their lowest result since the party’s founding in the 19th century. Meanwhile, extremists gained ground: AfD surged to a shocking 20.8%, securing second place, while the former communist Die Linke (“The Left”) captured nearly 9%.

Relaxing or abolishing the debt brake requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority—something mainstream parties held before the election but failed to use in time. When the new Bundestag convenes, that supermajority will be gone. A CDU-SPD coalition remains the only viable governing arrangement, given that all mainstream parties refuse to work with the AfD. However, neither the AfD nor Die Linke offers a feasible path forward. The AfD, despite its nationalist rhetoric, staunchly opposes lifting the debt brake, while Die Linke demands significant social spending in exchange for any rearmament, a trade-off that would divide the CDU and alienate its more fiscally conservative CSU allies.

A constitutional loophole offers a brief window of opportunity—but action must be swift. The new Bundestag will not convene until March 25th, meaning the outgoing, lame-duck parliament retains power until then. This provides Merz, the SPD, and the Greens—who together still hold a two-thirds majority—one last chance to amend the debt brake. Ideally, Germany should abandon the measure altogether, as its aversion to debt has hampered not only defense but also critical infrastructure, from roads and rail to hospitals and digital networks. At the very least, an exemption must be carved out for defense spending, including military aid to Ukraine.

Such a move would be politically unconventional and fiercely contested. Critics argue it would lack legitimacy, particularly after the surge in votes for extremist parties. Some fear Germany’s constitutional court could strike it down. But extraordinary times demand extraordinary measures. The Greens have already proposed an amendment to bolster aid to Ukraine, and Merz has signaled he is considering it. However, SPD support is crucial, and negotiations are reportedly underway.

If paralysis prevails, as it did before the election, Merz will have to pursue an alternative strategy. That could mean striking a deal with Die Linke—an unlikely but not impossible prospect. The Left would demand significant social spending in exchange for supporting defense increases, a price that many in the CDU and CSU would find unpalatable.

The alternative is far worse. By publicly rebuking Trump, Merz risks accelerating U.S. disengagement from NATO or at least exposing the alliance’s fractures to Russia. If he fails to secure the necessary funding and develop a long-term strategy for Europe’s defense, Germany will become even more vulnerable. Most incoming leaders face their first real tests after taking office. But with Trump and Vladimir Putin already in motion, Merz does not have that luxury. Time is running out.